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Abstract
With the advance of online social networks, the screening of applicants during hiring can extend
beyond the usual application material. Although browsing the online prole of an applicant raises
ethical issues, this practice potentially improves the job matching, at virtually no cost to the
employer. In this paper, we investigate the use of online social networks as a reliable source of
information for recruiters on applicants in the French job market.
We set up a eld experiment using real accountant job o¤ers in the greater Paris area. We
adjust the content of Facebook accounts to manipulate the perceived origins of applicants (home-
town and language spoken) and analyze the impact on the number of callbacks received from
employers. The signal we manipulate to distinguish applicants is available only within the online
prole, not the application material. During a 12 month period from March 2012 to March 2013,
we submitted more than 800 applications. The test applicant received a third fewer callbacks
compared to the control applicant, a signicant di¤erence. Our results suggest that online proles
are used indeed to screen applicants, and that this occurs early in the hiring process.
During the course of the experiment, a change to the standard Facebook layout sent a part of
our signal, namely the language spoken by the applicants, into a sub-tab not directly visible from
the front page. This exogenous change (clicking on a tab is now required to access the information)
allowed us to measure the recruiters depth of search. In subsequent months, the gap between the
two applicant types shrank and virtually disappeared. This suggests that screening is supercial,
illustrating the existence of employer search costs for browsing an entire prole.
Keywords: Online Social Network; Labor Market Discrimination; Privacy; Field experiment.
JEL Codes: J71; D83; K31; C93.
1 Introduction
For a decade, Social Network Sites (SNSs) have been growing in popularity and have reached more
than one billion users worldwide.1 They radically changed the way many people create and manage
relationships with friends and families. However, the impact of these online services seems to extend
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much further, with the media regularly reporting employee dismissals motivated by information dis-
closed on social network proles.2 Moreover, many declarative surveys document the use of SNSs as
sources of information on applicants by employers (Clark and Roberts, 2010). As SNSs become ubiq-
uitous, the use by employers of information not originally aimed at them raises ethical and economic
issues. It demonstrates an increasing overlap of the professional and private spheres which could have
a impact on the functioning and e¢ ciency of the labor market. In this context, this study contributes
to the debate on privacy regulation and addresses the following question: Do online SNSs constitute
a reliable new source of information on applicants for recruiters? In other words, do recruiters screen
applicantsSNS proles and use this information in deciding to grant or deny an interview?
The hiring process is the central labor market mechanism and is crucial for the e¢ ciency of
the economy. The better the match between an employer and an applicant, the higher will be the
employees productivity (Autor, 2001). However, the economic literature shows that hiring is plagued
by search costs and incomplete bilateral information between employers and applicants (Stigler, 1962;
Spence, 1973). As a consequence, both players implement search and signaling strategies to nd the
best match (Rees, 1966; Salop, 1973a, 1973b; Spence, 1973; Holzer, 1987). Although there is a large
literature on applicantssearch and signaling strategies (Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999a), work on
the similar strategies of employers is scarcer (Granovetter, 1995; DeVaro, 2008; Oyer and Schae¤er,
2011). Employers play a central role in the functioning of the labor market and the job matching
process since applicants accept almost all job o¤ers (Barron et al., 1997). The literature on employers
deals mainly with two types of employer search strategies: extensive vs. intensive, and sequential
vs. non-sequential screening (Holzer, 1987; Barron et al., 1997). These search strategies could be
implemented using formal or informal search methods (Rees, 1966; Albrecht and van Ours, 2006; van
Ommeren and Russo, 2014). These two methods are associated with two main sources of information
for recruiters: the formal application material (resume, cover letter, etc.), and the informal referrals
and word-of-mouth. A recent trend in work on employers search strategies investigates the use of
SNSs in hiring (Clark and Roberts, 2010; Acquisti and Fong, 2013). Our paper aims to extend the
work on employerssearch strategies, and to focus more specically on SNSs as a reliable new channel
of information on applicants during hiring, in addition to application material and referrals.
So far, evidence on the use of SNSs by employers relies on declarative surveys whose results show
strong variation (see Clark and Roberts (2010) for examples). These variations could stem in part
from the qualitative nature of these surveys (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001) and in part from the
fact that using personal information during hiring is illegal, meaning respondents might be reluctant
to truthfully answer questions about their hiring practices. To avoid declarative bias, we opt for a eld
experiment methodology3 and create two ctitious applicants with identical resumes and application
cover letters but one di¤erence in their Facebook proles. While the control applicant has a typically
French prole, the test applicants Facebook prole reveals Marrakesh to be his hometown and Arabic
a spoken language. This signal appears only on the Facebook prole. We chose this signal because the
literature on labor market discrimination shows that this characteristic negatively a¤ects an applicants
call-back rate (Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) for the U.S.; Duguet et al. 2005, 2010; Jacquemet
et al., 2012 for France). Each applicant has a unique rst-name and last-name combination to ensure
that an employer searching the applicant on the Internet nds the right prole. The applicantsrst
names were chosen from among the most frequent French-sounding names for males of the applicants
age. Our candidates then apply for job openings for an accountant in the greater Paris area. In
the usual testing methodology, two applications for a job opening are sent simultaneously and the
resumes and cover letters of the two ctitious applicants are su¢ ciently di¤erent to avoid detection
2Some examples of employees dismissals related to SNSs and reported in the New York Times:
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/22/technology/employers-social-media-policies-come-under-regulatory-
scrutiny.html?pagewanted=all, or BBC: http://www.bbc.com/capital/story/20130626-can-social-media-get-you-red
3 Independently, Acquisti and Fong (2013) set up an experiment in the U.S. to test for several potentially discrimi-
nating signals on SNSs such as sexual orientation or marital status.
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by the employer (this approach is called systematic attribution). In our case, the two applicants have
identical resumes and cover letters and di¤er only in their name for identication, and their Facebook
prole for treatment manipulation. Therefore, we send one application per job opening using the
pseudo-random attribution method (see Ahmed et al., 2013; Acquisti and Fong, 2013). With this
method, we control during the experiment that the two ctitious candidates are applying for similar
job positions. Following the literature on hiring, we consider a call-back from the recruiter to set up
a job interview as a positive outcome. Since the two applicants are similar except for the Facebook
prole displaying their hometown and languages spoken, a signicant di¤erence in call-back rate can
stem only from observation by the employer of the signal that is available exclusively on the applicants
Facebook proles.4
From March 2012 to March 2013, we sent more than 800 applications, evenly divided between
the two applicants. The response rates for our ctitious applicants are signicantly di¤erent, at
respectively 12.2% and 16.9% for the control candidate. This suggests that employers search for
additional information on the applicant to the application package submitted by e-mail, and use the
information found on the Facebook prole to select an applicant for a job interview. In addition
to this rst result, during the experiment we observed an exogenous change in the layout of the
Facebook prole. Information on the languages spoken by the applicant, instead of being displayed
in the front page of the prole was pushed back into a tab. This change provided evidence on the
depth of employerssearch for personal information. Shortly after this layout change, which reduced
the di¤erentiating signal, the gap between the callback rates of two candidates reduced dramatically,
suggesting that the search for further information on the candidate is not deep and that employers
limit it to the front page of the online social network prole.
This article is organized as follows. The rst section reviews the job search literature with a special
focus on employers strategies, and presents our main hypothesis. The second section presents the
eld experiment and our protocol and the third presents the results of the eld experiment. The nal
section o¤ers some conclusions.
2 Literature review
The hiring process is usually characterized with search costs and bilateral information asymmetries
(Stigler, 1962; Spence, 1973; Salop and Salop, 1976). In this context, applicants and recruiters aim at
reducing these costs and asymmetries by implementing signalling and/or search strategies, reinforcing
the importance of information. These strategies have been extensively studied in the case of job
seekers.5 In contrast, employers strategies have been far less explored despite their importance in
the hiring process. In this article, we focus on employerssearch strategies, and especially on their
evolutions with the Internet.6
The literature on recruiters highlights the use of two main search strategies: extensive/intensive
and sequential/nonsequential, depending on the number of screened applicants and whether the
selection process is carried out continuously or sequentially (Rees, 1966; Barron et al., 1985). These
strategies could be implemented through formal or informal search methods (Rees, 1966, Albrecht and
4The main di¢ culty involved in testing our hypothesis is that the recruiters online search is not an observable
variable, i.e. it is impossible to know who are the viewers of a given online prole. For this reason, we set up an
experiment so that viewing one or the other of our ctitious proles translates into di¤erent call back rates, which
are directly observable. Incidentally, this also explains why legal attempts to forbid online searches during hiring are
di¢ cult to implement: recruitersbehaviors are not directly observable.
5The literature on applicantsjob search and signaling is large and beyond the scope of this article (see Lazear and
Oyer (2007) for a good review). For theoretical approaches, see Stigler, 1962; Salop, 1973a, 1973b; Spence, 1973; for
empirical evidence, see Stigler, 1962; Rees, 1966; Holzer, 1987.
6For the literature on employerssignaling strategies see Salop and Salop (1976), and Guasch and Weiss (1980) for
theoretical models. For empirical work, one can refer to Holzer (1987) and Albrecht and van Ours (2006).
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van Ours, 2006; van Ommeren and Russo, 2014). Formal method refers to the use of advertisements
in newspaper or employment agency, whereas informal method draws on recruiters social network.
These search methods imply that recruiters use two di¤erent support/channel of information about
applicants with application materials in the case of formal method (Rees, 1966), and referrals and
word-of-mouth for informal methods (Granovetter, 1995). More recently, the spread of the Internet
and development of online social networks has had a strong impact on employers strategies and
potentially provides a new channel of transmission of information via online proles on SNSs.
Employerssearch strategies
The literature on the employerssearch strategies during hiring is more recent and rather scarce
(Granovetter, 1995; DeVaro, 2008; Oyer and Schae¤er, 2011).7 According to this literature, employers
can choose between extensive search, i.e. search on a pool of applicants as large as possible, and/or
intensive search, i.e. search for additional information on selected applicants (Rees, 1966; Barron et
al., 1985; Holzer, 1987). Barron et al. (1985) use data such as average number of hours per applicant
for recruiting, to provide evidence of the existence of such strategies. More recent work highlights
an important feature of these search strategies, i.e. whether or not search is sequential. The model
proposed by Burdett and Cunningham (1998) considers search to be sequential if the rm o¤ers a
job position to an applicant immediately after receipt of her application and assuming the applicants
productivity exceeds a certain threshold. If the applicant accepts the position the search process
stops. Conversely, non-sequential search assumes that the rm pools a certain number of applications
and then screens them, and nally o¤ers the position to the best applicant. Empirical studies using
vacancy characteristics (required education, work experience, etc.), investigate the determinants of
search strategies. They show that both extensive and intensive strategies can be optimal depending
on characteristics such as job seekers strategies, vacancy duration, job characteristics, etc. (van
Ommeren and Russo, 2014). However, in most of these studies, the nature of the dependent variable,
namely vacancy duration, makes interpretation of the results di¢ cult. Andrews et al. (2008) point
out that a short (long) vacancy duration cannot be exactly interpreted as a sequential (non-sequential)
search strategy. According to van Ommeren and Russo (2014), empirical studies highlight a strong
relationship between search strategies (sequential or non sequential) and search methods (advertising,
private or public agency, etc.).
Employerssearch methods and channels of transmission of information
These search strategies could be implemented using formal or informal search methods (Rees, 1966;
Albrecht and van Ours, 2006; van Ommeren and Russo, 2014). Formal search methods refer to the use
by recruiters of advertisements and employment agency to ll a position. Informal search methods
rely on information gathered or received by recruiters from their social network (friends, relatives,
current or incumbent personnel, etc.). In the case of formal methods, the information consists in
the application material (resume, cover letter, etc.) directly or indirectly (via e.g. employment
agency) provided by the applicant (Rees, 1966). In the informal method, recruiters gather or receive
information through referrals and word-of-mouth from friends, relatives or former/current employees
(Albrecht and van Ours, 2006). In other words, each type of method is associated with a particular
channel of information.
Formal information channels include the basic application material screened by employers to select
applicants, i.e. cover letters and resumes. The information provided consists mainly of objectively
veriable information such as education, work experience, qualications, etc. Employers can screen
these documents and contact previous employers and/or school heads. During interview, if required
for the position advertised, the employer may have the opportunity to carry out additional checks
such as medical examination, credit worthiness, police record, etc. (Rees, 1966; Spence, 1973; Holzer,
1987; DeVaro, 2008).
7See Mortensen and Pissarides (1999a, 1999b) and Rogerson et al. (2005) for surveys dealing with search models for
applicants in the labor market.
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Informal information channels include information acquired from former colleagues and/or friends
of the applicant through referrals and word-of-mouth (Rees, 1966; Granovetter, 1995; Montgomery,
1992, Albrecht and van Ours, 2006; van Ommeren and Russo, 2008). According to Rees (1966),
former or current good employees are considered by employers as reliable channels of information
about potential recruits for two main reasons. First, employers anticipate that employees tend to
recommend candidates with similar competences and location. Second, employees know that their
referrals can impact their own reputation. As a result they tend to recommend people who they think
will be most appropriate. Furthermore, applicants who have been recommended for a position by a
friend or a relative tend to be more condent in the information provided about the position (type
of work, working atmosphere, bosss behaviors, etc.). Consequently, such applicants are more able to
assess whether their competences are a good t with the position. The empirical literature underlines
the complex e¤ects of informal contacts and networks on labor outcomes due to individual, relational
and employer heterogeneity (see Ionnides and Loury (2004) for a review). Since the work of Rees (1966)
and Granovetter (1995), many studies highlight the importance of referrals and recommendations in
hiring. More recent studies using newly available data (DeVaro, 2008) show that informal channels of
information matter as they carry reliable information that could only with di¢ culty spread through
formal channels.
SNSs as a new source of information for recruiters?
The labor market is being heavily impacted by the advance of the Internet. Employers benet
from lower costs for advertising job openings and applicants face lower costs in searching for relevant
job openings and sending applications. Overall, lower costs are expected to increase the e¢ ciency of
the labor market by improving the quality of employee-employer matching (Autor, 2001; Manning,
2011).8 However, Autor (2001) points out that the ease of application for job seekers can result in
excessive irrelevant applications which may increase employerscost of selection. As a consequence
of the overload of formal and standardized application information, employers may turn to informal
information on applicants to narrow their search.
In addition to easier access to formal information on applicants, the Internet also provides new
sources of information on applicants: their SNSs proles. The wide use of SNSs is making it easy for
employers to check background information about applicant (schools, current and former positions,
etc.), but also to access personal information not dedicated to them (trips, friends, hobbies, opinions,
etc.). In this way, SNSs constitute a new informal source of information in addition to referrals and
word-of-mouth. Unlike these sources of information, interaction with others is not required in the case
of SNSs. Recruiters can check online proles without the applicants awareness or consent. Evidence
of such practices among recruiters has been recently underlined in the literature through declarative
surveys (Clark and Roberts, 2010) or eld experiment on online discrimination (Acquisti and Fong,
2013). This privacy concern raises ethical and economic issues.
Most notably, there is an important discrepancy between the intent of SNSs users and that of
employers. The former tend to use SNSs casually as a tool for social interaction, including recre-
ational purposes, while the latter use them to gather personal information on applicants with direct
professional consequences. This di¤erence in the use of personal information may harm the quality
of the relationship between employers and employees (Clark and Roberts, 2010). Incidentally, this
new hiring practice is an illustration of the shifting boundaries between the personal and professional
spheres. On an economic viewpoint, personal information disclosed online may constitute a relevant
determinant of hiring decision. Apart from Acquisti and Fong (2013) for the U.S. labor market, how
secondary usage of personal information impacts matching during hiring has been neglected in the
literature. Following this recent strand, our paper tests whether SNSs has become a new reliable
informal source of information for recruiters on applicants (see Figure 1).
8See Pissarides (2000), and, Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) for a canonical model that introduces the matching
function but does not deal explicitly with the e¤ect of the Internet on the labor market.
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Figure 1: Sources of information about applicants
3 Experimental setting: Methodology and signal
Methodology
The most direct way to establish use of social media in hiring is asking employers. However, there
is a strong declarative bias due to the legal/ethical nature of the question. To circumvent this, we set
up a eld experiment.
Field experiments have been used in the literature to capture employershiring practices. They
rely upon two main methodologies: situation (or audit) testing,9 and correspondence testing. The
audit approach allows to focus on employershiring behaviors along the multiple steps of the hiring
process, i.e. i) whether they recall the candidate for an interview, ii) whether they o¤er the position
after the interview, and iii) the wage level o¤ered. The rst audit testing was conducted by Daniel
(1968).10 One of the limitations of this approach is that it is di¢ cult in practice to ensure similarity
of applicantsperformance during a face-to-face interview. Moreover, the actors direct interaction
with the employer during the interview raises strong concerns of experimenter bias (see Bertrand and
Mullainathan 2004 for further discussion).
Correspondence testing involves fewer methodological issues (Riach and Rich, 2002). It allows
for a higher level of control over the experimental environment, especially the content of applica-
tions. It is also less time-consuming (Bursell, 2007), and easier to rigorously reproduce. According to
Bursell (2007), correspondence testing is a type of randomized experiment,11and therefore provides
the strongest possible opportunity to draw causal inferences. The main di¢ culty lies in making the
applications similar in all relevant aspects, so that only the tested characteristic varies between the
two applications. Last, although correspondence testing reveals discrimination at the call-back stage
and not at the nal hiring decision stage, it has been shown that around 90% of the discrimination
occurs at the call-back stage (Riach and Rich, 2002).
Therefore, we choose to carry out a correspondence test. However, unlike usual correspondence
tests where recruiters receive at least two ctitious applications, we send one application per job
9Audit testing consists in real persons briefed by the experimenters, usually professional actors, applying for the
opening and presenting themselves to the job interview. They then act in a similar manner for every interview. The
characteristics of the actors or the way they behave during the interview can thus be manipulated all other things equal.
10See Bursell (2007) for other labor market-related audits results and limitations.
11Examples of correspondence tests: in the UK (Brown and Gay, 1985; Hubbuck and Carter, 1980), in Australia
(Riach and Rich, 1991) and in the U.S. (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004).
6
opening with quasi-identical applicants. We created two ctitious applicants with identical application
material (resumes and cover letters) except for one manipulated characteristic or signal. This approach
has two main advantages. First, the two applicants are identical in term of competence and experience
which drastically limits potential compounds. Second, as a consequence, each recruiter receives only
one application. This means that the study only marginally inuences the hiring process (compared
to sending multiple applications per opening) which is desirable from an ethical view point and in
terms of e¢ ciency. Third, as the applications are sent to two separate samples of rms, the detection
risk is non-existent. We therefore need to insure that the two applicants apply for similar positions
in terms of job and rm characteristics. We do this by using job openings from the French public
employment agency that provide detailed information on both the position and the rm. This point
is developed in the following protocol description.
Signal
In our experiment, the di¤erence between the two applicants consists in an Arabic signal on one
applicants Facebook prole. The Arabic prole mentions that the applicant is from a Moroccan city
(Marrakesh), and speaks Arabic. The control prole is from a French city (Brive-la-Gaillarde) and
speaks Italian. We thus di¤erentiate our applicants by city of origin and language spoken as displayed
on the Facebook prole.
The literature highlights the importance of an applicants foreign origins (see e.g. Duguet et al.,
2010 for applicants from the Paris area) and language skills for potential employers during hiring
(Oreopoulos, 2009; Edo et al., 2013). Therefore, provided the signal is perceived, it can be expected
to have a negative impact on the odds of being called back.
The literature shows that, within the application package, information triggering employer rejection
can be conveyed by the applicants name, especially her foreign origin (Bertrand and Mullainathan,
2004; Ahmed et al., 2008; Jacquemet and Yannelis, 2012; Berson, 2012; Duguet et al., 2010), or part-
ners gender (Ahmed et al., 2013) which signals the candidates sexual orientation, doing voluntary
work for a community organization (Weichselbaumer, 2003; Drydakis, 2009), or the photograph at-
tached to the resume (Weichselbaumer, 2003). However, manipulating those signals is not a suitable
strategy in our case since information on names and hobbies is included in the resume and could not
be evidence that the employer consulted the online prole.
Ahmed and Hammarstedt (2008) use the Internet as a medium to test for discriminatory practices
related to rental housing ads posted online. However, as in every preceding study, the discriminating
information is contained in the application package. In our study, the application is completely
similar for the two ctitious candidates, and the Internet is the medium for both transmission of the
application (by the candidate) and discovery of discriminating information (by the recruiter).
Resumes, cover letters and Facebook proles
For each applicant, on both the resume and the cover letter we indicate the following information,
in order: name, address, holding of a driving license, date of birth and age, phone number and e-
mail address. The applicants address is in an a­ uent Paris district (15th arrondissement) to avoid
location-based discrimination. The applicant holds a driving license. The phone numbers are distinct
in each resume so as to track candidatescall back. The e-mail address of each applicant is registered
on Gmail with user name following the same pattern "rstname.lastname@gmail.com". Names and
dates of birth are also available on the Facebook proles.
In our base resume, the applicant has a three-year higher education degree in accounting, a awless
school record, and three internships with various experience suitable for most accounting jobs. A
cover letter is included in the application. A cover letter that is too general and standardized is
usually not su¢ cient; employers usually seek a specic professional prole (customers, suppliers, asset
management, etc.). We pre-dened parts of the letter with standard sentences corresponding to the
common proles sought by recruiters, and included them according to what was specied in the ad.
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We used information on the recruiting rm that was available on the Internet, such as o¢ cial websites,
web articles, etc. If we were unable to nd information about the rm, we sent an unspecic cover
letters. Resumes and cover letters were submitted as pdf les. Pdf is a standard format that is easily
readable by recruiters. Before the start of the experiment and alongside conducting pre-tests, we
interviewed human resources managers to ensure relevance of the cover letters to current job market
conditions.
The rst and last names of each applicant are French-sounding. The rst names were picked from
the top-ve rst names for the year of birth. Each combination of rst name and last name is unique,
and our ctitious proles are the sole results when searching on these rst and last names on the three
leading French language web search engines, and on Facebook.12 Each combination corresponds to
one unique Facebook prole. To test that the results do not depend on the specic names or work
experience of the rst pair, we create a second pair of applicants with di¤erent names and with fewer
work experience.
Work experience
Time Span First name & Name Candidates type at the beginning
of the experiment
March 2012 Thomas Marvaux Control (French signal) 6.5 to 13 months
- Sept. 2012 Stéphane Marcueil Test (Morrocan signal)
Oct. 2012 Julien Bautrant Control (French signal) 1 to 6.5 months
- March 2013 Nicolas Lautrant Test (Morrocan signal)
Table 1: The two pairs of applicants
Selecting the job openings
We selected the job openings published by the French public agency for employment, Pôle Emploi
(PE), during the period March, 2012 to March, 2013. Only job openings posted through the PE public
agency website are collected; other recruitment channels, such as Monster, are not considered. We
focus on PE openings for two main reasons: First, PE systematically provides detailed information
on the job (wage, contract, working hours, required education and work experience, etc.) and the
rm (name, location, sector, size, etc.) which is crucial for pseudo-random attribution of applicants
to job o¤ers. Other popular French employment websites (Monster, Keljob, Indeed, etc.) provide
much less detail except in the case of a few job ads. Second, since PE is the public employment
agency it has a transparent equal opportunities policy and discriminatory employers will likely avoid
posting their openings on the PE website. Auto-selection of employers using this recruitment channel
is thus likely to make it more di¢ cult to nd a signicant di¤erence between the two candidates.
The applications are submitted via a standard email referring to the advertised position and the
reference number, with the resume and cover letter as attachments.13 We selected only openings that
provided the recruiters direct contact information (contact name and e-mail), and excluded those
which required the applicant to contact a third-party, usually PE or a recruitment agency. Only
openings for relatively long-term contracts were considered, i.e. jobs with an undened-duration work
contract (CDI) or a xed-duration contract (CDD) of 6 months or more.14 Our applicants have
three years of undergraduate education in accounting, and we responded to ads in the three relevant
categories (accountant, assistant-accountant, and aid-accountant) in the PE categorization. For each
selected opening, we generate the application material, i.e. the resume and the cover letter, using
12The market shares of the web search engines in France in December 2012 were: 90.1% for Google, 3.3% for Bing
and 1.5% for Yahoo (source: http://www.atinternet.com, last retrieved: June, 2014).
13A few ads were disregarded either because the e-mail address provided in the ad was wrong or no email address
was included.
14We assume that very short employment periods are not associated with deep search or screening of applicants.
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pre-dened key sentences to match advertised job. At this point, to avoid experimenter bias, the
material was not assigned to an applicant. Assignment to an applicant occurred only after all the
application material had been generated.
Pseudo-Random Assignment Procedure
We observe the recruitersbehavior through the di¤erences (if any) in return rates for the two
ctitious applicants. The candidates have identical application packages and di¤er only in selected
information on their Facebook proles. Following Ahmed et al. (2013) and Acquisti and Fong (2013),
we use a pseudo-random assignment procedure where only one application is sent per job o¤er. The
type of applicant is pseudo-randomly assigned to each application, so that all along the experiment
similar job o¤ers are attributed to each applicant.15 Half of our sample of job openings receives an
application from the control candidate and the other half from the Arabic candidates. The tradi-
tional systematic assignment procedure provides information on how a given employer responds to
every candidate who applied. However, we are interested in showing that employers that received
an application from the control candidate called him back for interview more often, on average, than
employers who received the Arabic candidate. We control that this systematic di¤erence is not due
to rm or job characteristics. In addition, when using a testing approach the experimenter needs to
construct two ctitious candidates who are su¢ ciently di¤erent to avoid detection but close enough
that the di¤erence in call backs between the two candidates can be attributable only to the factor of
interest, and not to other factors which were changed to di¤erentiate the two candidates. The random
assignment procedure requires that the number of applications is doubled but completely alleviates
the trade-o¤ between the risk of candidates being detected and the ability to interpret the results. As
our candidates never both apply to the same company, the risk of detection is considerably lower than
with a usual testing methodology. And since we do not need to di¤erentiate the candidates articially
to avoid detection, we can o¤er strictly identical candidates.
4 Results
Experiment overview
The experiment covers a period of one year from March 19, 2012 to March 19, 2013. During
this period, we sent a total of 837 applications. As shown in Figure 2, we sent applications for both
candidates at similar rates over the period. The vertical red line indicates the time when we changed
to the second pair of ctitious applicants (names, work experience and Facebook proles), as discussed
in the previous section.
Samples balancing Since we send one application per opening, our database is divided into two
samples, rms that received the control candidate and rms that received the test candidate. We
ensured that the two samples were balanced in relation to rmsobservable characteristics by using
pseudo-random sampling. Table 2 below presents the descriptive statistics for the job positions and
rms applied to.16
We observe that, on average, both applicants applied to similar positions in terms of jobs and rm
characteristics. During the whole experiment our applicants received 122 positive recalls for interview.
This global return rate is quite high (14.6%) compared to other similar studies (see e.g. Duguet and
Petit, 2005 and Duguet et al., 2010 for the Paris region). The most plausible explanation for the higher
call back rate in our study is that we matched cover letter and resume to the job opening for each
application, incorporating pre-dened sentences corresponding to the characteristics of the rm and
15This pseudo-random assignment is based on job position (accountant, assistant-accountant, etc.), required work
experience, and rm size and sector (see Table 2 for descriptive statistics).
16Tests of equality of mean or proportion (depending on the type of variable) have been computed. These tests allow
us to accept the null hypothesis of equality in proportion or mean at the 5% threshold for all variables in Table 2.
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Variable Description
Control
candidate
Test
candidate
Accountant: 41.2% 39.1%
Specialized acc.: 13.6% 15.8%
Job position Accounting assistant: 26.2% 25.2%
Acc. & secretary assistant: 15.9% 17.3%
Other accounting assistant: 3.1% 2.6%
Contract Long term (CDI) 74.8% 74.8%
Short term (CDD) 25.2% 25.2%
Short term contract length (mean/sd/min/max, month): 7.8/3.6/6/24 8.1/4.1/6/36
Work time (mean/sd/min/max, hours): 34.0/5.9/7.5/40 34.0/5.7/8/43
Not specied: 37.6% 40.1%
CAP/BEP: 2.1% 2.1%
Required education Bac: 10.2% 7.2%
Bac +2: 45.0% 45.8%
Bac +3: 5.0% 4.8%
No experience: 23.3% 23.3%
6 months - 1 year: 11.7% 12.7%
Required work experience 2 years: 28.6% 25.4%
3 years: 17.4% 19.2%
4 or 5 years: 19.1% 19.4%
Wage (mean/sd/min/max, e/hour): 12.5/2.6/8.6/23.6 12.4/2.3/8.5/20.8
Application delay 1.94 (sd: 1.52) 1.98 (sd: 1.58)
0-5 employees: 23.6% 23.5%
6-19 emp.: 27.6% 27.4%
Size 20-49 emp.: 19.7% 19.9%
50-249 emp.: 19.3% 20.1%
250+ emp.: 9.8% 9.1%
Private: 82.6% 82.0%
Firm status Public: 6.0% 5.0%
Not-for-prot: 11.4% 13.0%
Sector See Annex 1 - - - -
Location See Annex 1 - - - -
Total number of applications 420 417
Table 2: Overall descriptive statistics of the applications
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Figure 2: Cumulative number of applications sent, by type of applicant
the advertised position. Most recruiters contacted our applicants by phone (68.0%) or e-mail (26.3%).
A few chose contact by both phone and e-mail (5.7%). All the applicantspostal addresses were real,
but no regular mail was ever received. Table 3 shows the overall results of the eld experiment.
Application outcome Total
Type of applicant Negative Positive
Control candidate 349 (83.1%) 71 (16.9%) 420
Test candidate 366 (87.8%) 51 (12.2%) 417
Total 715 (85.4%) 122 (14.6%) 837
Table 3: Overall experiment outcomes
Table 3 and Figure 3 show a signicantly lower call-back rate for the test candidate (12.2%)
compared to the control (16.9%).17 A Chi2 test indicates that this di¤erence is signicant (Chi2
statistics=3.67; Pr=0.055). This result validates our hypothesis that recruiters screen the Facebook
proles of our applicants and used the information available on these proles when deciding whether
to call our applicants back for interview. Robustness checks of this result are provided in Annex 2
which also includes time dummies and control variables in Table 2.
Variable of interest The three robustness checks in Annex 2 conrm the signicant negative
impact of the Arabic signal available on the online prole, on the probability of being invited for
interview.18 Models 2 and 3 which include additional control variables show that some also have a
signicant inuence on the likelihood of a positive outcome.
17Figure 3 is presented in chronological order. The work experience of the rst two applicants ranged from 6.5 months
in March 2012 to 13 months in September 2012, while the work experience of the last two applicants ranged from 1
month in October 2012 to 6.5 months in March 2013. See Annex 13 for the experiments timing.
18Three models are provided in Annex 2: Model 1 contains only the main explicative variable tested in this work,
namely test, Model 2 includes all the available control variables, and Model 3 includes all the control variables except
mean wage due to multicollinearity issues. The condition index of Model 2 is equal to 29.8. It is very close to the
threshold indicating multicollinearity problems according to Belsley et al. (1980). This multicollinearity problem is
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Control variables The control variables which turn out to be signicant highlight additional
results about the hiring process generally. Firstly, we observe a negative impact of over-education on
the probability of being selected. Secondly, during the experiment the applicantswork experience
ranged from 1 to 13 months. It appears that only a large di¤erence between applicants current work
experience and that required by recruiters is an impediment. Only four or ve years of experience
di¤erent from what the recruiter requires seems to negatively a¤ect the odds of call-back. Thirdly,
we noticed a negative non-linear e¤ect of distance from the job. Close commuting distances (30-90
minutes) have a negative inuence on the probability to be selected, but longer distances (over 90
minutes) and shorter (under 30 minutes) have no signicant impact, suggesting that employers would
expect the successful applicant to relocate closer rather than endure a long commute (van Ommeren
et al., 1999). Finally, only three sectors have signicant e¤ects, namely industry, teaching/research,
and hotel/restaurant. One possible explanation for this is that although we designed the applicants
resumes to t as many industries as possible, they do not t all activities. The activities of teaching and
research use very specic public accounting beyond the scope of our applicantsskills and education.
Exogenous layout change On December, 2012 Facebook changed the layout of its proles,19
from a single page to a front page which includes tabs to provide access to certain personal information.
Such personal information, which used to be directly available in the rst page of the prole, is now
available only if viewers click on the relevant tab. Specically, the new proles provide information on
city of origin on the front page but information on language(s) is accessed by clicking the Abouttab.
Other aspects of the experimental setting remained unchanged. Comparing the results before and
after the layout modication allows us to isolate the impact, if any, of this ergonomic change on the
economic outcome. The period from March, 2012 to December, 2012 allows us to establish our main
result: a Facebook prole provides recruiters with a reliable source of information on applicants.20
The second period from December, 2012 to March, 2013 provides some evidence about the depth
of the screening performed by recruiters within the online proles. We discuss the results of these
consecutive parts of the experiment below.
Note: The second pair of applicants graduated in September 2012 and therefore have less work
experience. See table and gure in Annex 13 for the details of the di¤erences between the two pairs
of applicants.
First part of the experiment
The rst two applicants were used during the 6.5 months from March 19, 2012 to September 30,
2012. The two applicants have work experience ranging from 6.5 months at the beginning of this part
to 13 months at the end (see Annex 13 for more details on the experiment timing). During this period
we sent a total of 462 applications. Table 4 and Figure 4 below summarize the results during this rst
period:
not surprising as the wage o¤ered is related to the required education level and to other job characteristics such as the
required experience, the sector, the job position and the rm size among others. Once we exclude mean wage in the
model 3, the condition index fall down to 20.4.
19Link to the o¢ cial announcement of the Facebook layout change: http://newsroom.fb.com/News/584/
Improvements-to-Timeline].
Link to Facebooks announcement of the layout change in December on ABC News: http://abcnews.go.
com/blogs/technology/2012/12/facebook-may-be-changing-your-timeline-redesign-tests-in-progress/#.
UNOU516etEM.twitter and on other news, or bloggers websites that observed this change about Decem-
ber 2012: http://mashable.com/2013/01/08/facebook-timeline-change-new/ ; http://socialmediatoday.
com/mohammed-anzil/1100946/facebook-way-change-your-timeline-again ; http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_
3-57543175-93/facebook-looking-into-a-slimmer-trimmer-timeline-layout/ ; http://www.insidefacebook.com/
2012/10/31/facebook-tests-timeline-layout-with-single-column-of-posts/ and http://www.marismith.com/
quick-guide-facebook-profile-layout-image/.
20 In the rst 8 months, the control applicant received 62 positive call-backs from 311 applicants (19.9%); the test
applicant was recalled 36 times from 302 applications (11.9%), i.e. Chi2 = 7.33; Pr = 0.007.
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Figure 3: Cumulative call-back rates by applicant type
Figure 4: First two applicants call-back rates
Application outcome Total
Type of applicant Negative Positive
Control candidate 181 (78.7%) 49 (21.3%) 230
Test candidate 201 (86.6%) 31 (13.4%) 232
Total 382 (82.7%) 80 (17.3%) 462
Table 4: Call-back statistics of the rst two applicants
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The rst part of the experiment shows a consistent gap in the number of call-backs received by
our two applicants. In particular, Figure 4 shows a roughly constant gap of 8 percentage points
between the two applicants in favor of the control candidate who received 21.3% of positive returns
compared to 13.4% for the test candidate. A Chi2 test conrms the signicance of this di¤erence
(Chi2 statistics=5.09; Pr=0.024).21
Based on the experimental protocol in place, this gap favoring the control candidate can result only
from two joint choices of employers: i) screening of applicantsFacebook proles, and ii) exploitation
of the information collected from these proles to decide whether or not to recall the candidate.
Incidentally, the fact that employers use the information obtained from Facebook suggests also that it
is considered reliable although not part of the formal application package. It appears that the content
of the online prole seems to carry important weight for the decision to call back.
Second part of the experiment
The second pair of ctitious applicants was used during 5.5 months from October 1, 2012 to March
19, 2013. In this case, the two applicantswork experience ranged from 1 month at the beginning of
this part to 6.5 months at the end. During this period we sent a total of 375 applications. Table 5
and Figure 5 summarize the results of this second part:
Figure 5: Call back rates for second two applicants
Application outcome Total
Type of applicant Negative Positive
Control candidate 168 (88.4%) 22 (11.6%) 190
Test candidate 165 (89.2%) 20 (10.8%) 185
Total 333 (88.8%) 42 (11.2%) 375
Table 5: Call-back statistics of the second two applicants
21 Information on the similarity of the applications during this period and additional robustness checks for this result
are available respectively in Annexes 3, 4 and 5.
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Table 5 and Figure 5 show that both applicants had similar call-back rates (11.6% and 10.8%) at
the end of the second part of the experiment. These callback rates are lower than those in the rst
part of the experiment, which was expected since the applicants have shorter work experience. The
two call-back rates are not signicantly di¤erent (Chi2 statistics=0.05; Pr=0.81), which leads us to
conclude that our two applicants are no longer di¤erent from the recruiterspoint of view.
The second part of the experiment from October, 2012 to March, 2013 is usefully divided into two
sub-periods: before and after December 2012, when the Facebook layout changed. Table 6 summarizes
the main results of the two sub-periods:
1st sub-period from Oct. 1 2012
to Nov. 30 2012
2nd sub-period from Dec. 1 2012
to March 19 2013
Total
Negative Positive Total Negative Positive Total
Control candidate 68 (84.0%) 13 (16.0%) 81 100 (91.7%) 9 (8.3%) 109 190
Arabic candidate 65 (92.9%) 5 (7.1%) 70 100 (87.0%) 15 (13.0%) 115 185
Total 133 (88.1%) 18 (11.9%) 151 200 (89.3%) 24 (10.7%) 224 375
Table 6: Call-back statistics of the last two applicants by sub-periods
During the rst two months of the second part with the new applicants (new names and graduation
dates), we again observe an 8-percentage point gap in call back rates between the control (16.0%)
and the test (7.1%) candidates. A Chi2 test indicates the signicance of this di¤erence at the 10%
threshold (Chi2 statistics=2.84; Pr=0.092). In other words, during the rst eight months of the
experiment the gap between the two types of applicants remained fairly constant, and highlighted the
use of online proles in employersselection processes.
In December 2012 we observe a decreased gap between our applicant pairs. During the last 4
months of the experiment, the test candidate has a call-back rate that is not statistically di¤erent from
that of the control applicant, respectively 13.0% and 8.3% (Chi2 statistics=1.34; Pr=0.24). After 8
months characterized by a constant gap in call-backs between the two applicants, the Facebook layout
changed and the gap shrank. After the change, our results suggest that both applicants are similar
from the point of view of employers. Since the strength of the Arabic signal on the test Facebook
prole was reduced by the layout change, distinguishing the two applicants would require deeper
browsing of proles. Our result is conrmed by other studies on discrimination showing that language
skill concerns are a strong element of job discrimination (Oreopoulos, 2009; Edo et al., 2013).22 This
part of the experiment is thus consistent with search behavior which does not involves very thorough
screening by employers of applicantsSNS proles and reliance only on the front page. More study
is required to characterize this behavior further. For instance, the applicantseducation level in our
experiment is three years undergraduate study; it remains to be seen whether more senior jobs would
involve more thorough SNS prole screening.
5 Conclusion
This study aimed at extending the relatively scarce literature on recruiters search strategies. We
investigate the potential use of SNSs, in our case Facebook, as a reliable source of information about
22Mention of a language-related skill was randomly attributed to half of the applications sent, and consisted of reference
to an award in a language contest, writing in a college newspaper, or membership of a crossword club. Discrimination
dropped substantially for female (not male) applicants with this addition. Oreopoulos (2009) complemented large-scale
experimentation by an audit study and interviews to highlight this motivation for discrimination.
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applicants for recruiters during hiring. So far, the literature has focused only on the usual sources
of information on applicants (application material and referrals). Declarative surveys on the use of
SNSs in hiring are a¤ected by a strong declarative bias due to the ethical and legal issues surrounding
the collection of applicants personal data. We therefore set up a eld experiment, using real job
o¤ers for accountants in the greater Paris area. This experiment consisted of creating two ctitious
applicants that di¤ered only in their perceived origins, observable solely on their Facebook prole.
In line with the literature on discrimination, this signal  if observed and considered reliable  is
expected to have a signicant negative e¤ect on the call-back rates of the test applicant compared to
the control. Conversely, if recruiters do not screen applicantsFacebook prole, the quasi-similarity
of their application material (resume and cover letter) will lead to similar call-back rates for both.
During 12 months (from March 2012 to March 2013), we applied for job openings for accountants in
the Paris region using pseudo-random assignment method, and sent more than 400 applications per
applicant.
The results show a signicant gap between the test and control applicants, with respectively 12.2%
and 16.9% of positive returns. During the course of the experiment, a change in the standard Facebook
layout sent information on the language to a sub-page, not directly visible from the front page. The
extra step of clicking a tab to access that information allowed us to measure the depth of the recruiters
search. Therefore, the experiment is split into two sub periods - before and after the Facebook layout
change in December 2012. The rst sub-period from March 2012 to December 2012 shows a clear and
consistent gap of 8 percentage points between the control (21.3%) and test (13.4%) applicants. The
experimental protocol ensures that the signicant di¤erence results from observation of the Arabic
signal available on the test applicants Facebook prole. The main result of this article is that SNSs
are used in hiring to screen applicants and do a¤ect the employers decision to grant an interview.
The second part of the experiment is based on an unexpected change in the layout of Facebook
proles which occurred in December, 2012. This modication strongly a¤ected the Arabic signal as
only a part of it (i.e. the hometown) still appeared on the Facebook front page, while the second part
(i.e. language spoken) was positioned at the bottom of a secondary page (in the "About" tab). This
natural experiment allowed us to learn more about the SNS screening practices of recruiters since,
following this change the two candidates exhibited no signicant di¤erence in their call-back rates. It
suggests that screening is supercial, illustrating the existence of search costs for employers to browse
an entire prole.
An implication for policy is that applicants should know that their SNSs proles are considered
reliable means of assessment and selection by many recruiters. It is important during a job search
to treat the SNS prole as a part of the application material. A communication campaign could
be organized to inform people of the secondary use of their personal information and the potential
consequences for the probability of nding a job and for their professional careers. Our ndings also
suggest potential solutions, ranging from locking ones prole, to cleaning ones SNS prole during
job search or various assessment periods, to the use of multiple SNS proles ("o¢ cial" accessible to
anyone, and private), to the use of an avatar. However, the impact of not having an online presence
while looking for a job should be assessed in further studies.
It should be noted that the layout change leading to a signicant gap in call-back rates was
minor. However, it changed the assessment of our applicants and the nal economic outcome quite
dramatically. Indeed, this type of recruiter behavior demonstrates the increasing overlap between the
personal and professional spheres.
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Annexe 1. Job applications by sector and applicants type
Control
applicant
Test
applicant
Accounting 10.5% 10.1%
Association/Union 4.0% 3.6%
Transport 4.0% 4.8%
Bank/insurance 3.6% 3.8%
Construction 3.3% 4.1%
Retail trade 5.5% 5.5%
Wholesale trade 10.9% 10.8%
Audit & consulting 6.2% 6.5%
Culture/leisure 1.9% 2.2%
Sector Management 4.8% 4.1%
Teaching/research 3.6% 3.1%
Hotel/restaurant 3.3% 4.1%
Real estate 4.8% 4.8%
Telecom/computer 3.8% 4.3%
Health/social 5.7% 6.2%
Public organizations 1.9% 1.9%
Advertising/communication 3.6% 3.1%
Business services 9.1% 8.2%
Personal services 3.6% 3.8%
Industry/energy/waste 5.9% 5.0%
Seine-et-Marne 4.5% 4.3%
Yvelines 9.8% 9.6%
Essonne 6.2% 7.2%
Hauts-de-Seine 16.4% 17.0%
Seine-Saint-Denis 10.7% 10.3%
Val-de-Marne 9.8% 10.6%
Location Val-dOise 4.0% 3.8%
Paris central districts 6.7% 6.5%
Paris North-East districts 5.9% 5.8%
Paris North-West districts 14.1% 13.7%
Paris South-East districts 4.5% 3.8%
Applicantsdistrict and 7.4% 7.4%
contiguous Parisian districts
Total number of applications 420 417
Paris areas denitions:
 Paris central district: 1st , 2nd , 3rd , 4th and 5th Paris districts ;
 Paris North-East districts: 10th , 11th , 19th and 20th Paris districts ;
 Paris North-West districts: 8th , 9th , 17th and 18th Paris districts ;
 Paris South-East districts: 12th and 13th Paris districts ;
 Applicants district and contiguous Paris districts: 15th , 16th , 17th , 6th and 7th Paris districts.
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Annexe 2. Robustness check: whole experiment
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Applicant type
Control app. ref. ref. ref.
Test app. -0.206+ (0.107) -0.254** (0.116) -0.240** (0.115)
Application delay
No delay - - - - ref. ref.
1 day - - - - 0.069 (0.212) 0.045 (0.207)
2 days - - - - -0.110 (0.224) -0.159 (0.219)
3 days - - - - -0.413 (0.260) -0.425+ (0.255)
4 days - - - - -0.418 (0.313) -0.443 (0.307)
5-9 days - - - - 0.081 (0.314) 0.047 (0.309)
Contract type
Short term contract - - - - ref. ref.
Long term contract - - - - -0.146 (0.138) -0.185 (0.138)
Job position
Accounting assistant - - - - ref. ref.
Acc. & secretary assist. - - - - 0.262 (0.176) 0.213 (0.175)
Other accounting assist. - - - - -0.606 (0.494) -0.626 (0.482)
Accountant - - - - 0.101 (0.167) -0.054 (0.159)
Specialized accountant - - - - 0.166 (0.214) -0.017 (0.208)
Mean wage o¤er - - - - -0.099*** (0.032) - - - -
Required education
Bac+3 - - - - ref. ref.
Not specied - - - - -0.578** (0.268) -0.453+ (0.264)
CAP/BEP - - - - -1.285** (0.598) -1.097+ (0.577)
Bac - - - - -0.824** (0.344) -0.649+ (0.331)
Bac+2 - - - - -0.437+ (0.263) -0.318 (0.257)
Required work experience
No work experience ref. ref.
6 months-1 year - - - - 0.045 (0.197) 0.035 (0.195)
2 years - - - - -0.008 (0.162) -0.073 (0.159)
3 years - - - - -0.070 (0.187) -0.190 (0.186)
4 or 5 years - - - - -0.417+ (0.220) -0.631*** (0.208)
to be continued on next page
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Public transport time
Less than 30 minutes - - - - ref. ref.
31-60 minutes - - - - -0.279** (0.133) -0.270** (0.132)
61-90 minutes - - - - -0.692*** (0.205) -0.670*** (0.205)
91-120 minutes - - - - -0.345 (0.362) -0.300 (0.362)
120+ minutes - - - - -0.808+ (0.477) -0.819 (0.499)
Firm size
5- employees - - - - ref. ref.
6-19 emp. - - - - -0.079 (0.168) -0.090 (0.168)
20-49 emp. - - - - 0.107 (0.175) 0.078 (0.174)
50-249 emp. - - - - 0.077 (0.189) 0.015 (0.186)
250+ emp. - - - - -0.048 (0.230) -0.046 (0.228)
Firm sector
Accounting - - - - ref. ref.
Association/Union - - - - -0.434 (0.378) -0.407 (0.379)
Transport - - - - 0.275 (0.293) 0.372 (0.287)
Bank/insurance - - - - -0.331 (0.348) -0.295 (0.339)
Construction - - - - -0.635 (0.563) -0.591 (0.563)
Retail trade - - - - -0.185 (0.302) -0.140 (0.300)
Wholesale trade - - - - -0.322 (0.268) -0.280 (0.264)
Audit & consulting - - - - -0.061 (0.283) -0.058 (0.278)
Culture/leisure - - - - -0.720 (0.487) -0.624 (0.509)
Management - - - - -0.197 (0.306) -0.145 (0.297)
Teaching/research - - - - -1.249*** (0.409) -1.105*** (0.411)
Hotel/restaurant - - - - -0.964** (0.384) -0.863** (0.376)
Real estate - - - - -0.178 (0.317) -0.150 (0.314)
Telecom/computer - - - - -0.376 (0.315) -0.404 (0.318)
Health/social - - - - -0.114 (0.331) -0.018 (0.333)
Public organization - - - - -0.391 (0.507) -0.221 (0.518)
Advertising/communication - - - - -0.120 (0.330) -0.125 (0.322)
Business services - - - - -0.376 (0.272) -0.343 (0.272)
Personal services - - - - -0.630 (0.394) -0.527 (0.391)
Industry, energy and waste - - - - -1.386*** (0.455 -1.287*** (0.435)
Firm status
Private ref. ref.
Public 0.431 (0.307) 0.408 (0.312)
Not-for-Prot 0.377 (0.239) 0.317 (0.243)
end of table, see next page
22
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Time dummies
March 2012 - - - - ref. ref.
April 2012 - - - - -1.213*** (0.419) -1.216*** (0.412)
May 2012 - - - - -0.299 (0.336) -0.323 (0.336)
June 2012 - - - - 0.052 (0.329) 0.027 (0.327)
July 2012 - - - - -0.339 (0.319) -0.365 (0.316)
Aug. 2012 - - - - -0.166 (0.336) -0.186 (0.336)
2012-09-01 - - - - -0.329 (0.329) -0.390 (0.327)
2012-10-01 - - - - -0.403 (0.353) -0.465 (0.346)
2012-11-01 - - - - -0.477 (0.360) -0.503 (0.358)
Dec. 2012 - - - - -0.358 (0.395) -0.356 (0.386)
2013-01-01 - - - - -0.356 (0.369) -0.369 (0.366)
Feb. 2013 - - - - -0.721+ (0.387) -0.762** (0.381)
March 2013 - - - - -0.907** (0.432) -0.963** (0.425)
Constant -0.960*** (0.073) 1.785*** (0.579) 0.673 (0.453)
Observations 837 837 837
Pseudo-R2 0.005 0.169 0.158
Robust standard errors in brackets.
+, ** and *** mean respectively signicant at 10%, 5% and 1% tresholds.
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Annexe 3. 1st part of experiment: job and rm characteristics of applications
Variable Description
Control
candidate
Test
candidate
Job position Accountant: 44.3% 43.1%
Specialized acc.: 9.6% 10.3%
Accounting assistant: 23.9% 29.3%
Acc. & secretary assistant: 18.7% 14.7%
Other accounting assistant: 3.5% 2.6%
Contract Long term (CDI) 28.7%* 19.4%*
Short term (CDD) 71.3%* 80.6%*
Short term contract lenght (mean/sd/min/max, month): 8.2/4.1/6/24 7.8/3.3/6/24
Worktime23 (mean/sd/min/max): 34.3/5.4/7.5/39 34.2/5.6/16/43
Required education Not specied: 40.4% 38.8%
CAP/BEP: 1.3% 2.1%
Bac: 11.3%* 5.2%*
Bac +2: 42.6% 49.6%
Bac +3: 4.4% 4.3%
Required work experience No experience: 25.2% 27.1%
6 months-1 year: 12.6% 12.5%
2 years: 27.8% 23.3%
3 years: 16.5% 19.4%
4 or 5 years: 17.9% 17.7%
Mean wage (mean/sd/min/max, e/hour): 12.3/2.4/9.2/23.4 12.3/2.2/8.5/19.8
Application delay24 (mean/sd/min/max): 1.3/1.2/0/5* 1.6/1.3/0/6*
Size 0-5 employees: 23.5% 23.3%
6-19 emp.: 27.8% 29.7%
20-49 emp.: 17.8% 19.0%
50-249 emp.: 21.3% 21.1%
250+ emp.: 9.6% 6.9%
Firm status Private: 83.0% 83.6%
Public: 6.5% 4.7%
Not-for-prot: 10.4% 11.6%
Sector See Annex 4 - - - -
Location See Annex 4 - - - -
Total number of applications 230 232
* indicates a signicant di¤erence in mean or proportion between the two applicants at 5% thresh-
old.
Note: Given the large number of variables taken into account, some di¤erences between the two
applicants could appear among control variables for sub-period of the experimentation. For instance,
we can observe signicant proportion or mean di¤erences between the two applicants in the Table
below for contract type, application delay and some job positions. For some extent, these di¤erences
stem from the detailed manner we opted to expose the variables. In a less detailed way and without
loss of relevance, all accounting assistant positions could be merged (accounting assistant, accounting
and secretary assistant, and, other accounting assistant), and then the proportion di¤erence would not
hold any more. In the case of contract type, the di¤erence is not due to a detailed manner to present
this variable but to our pseudo-random assignment method during which we focus more especially on 4
characteristics: rms size and sector in addition to job position and required work experience. Then,
some di¤erences could temporally appear among other control variables. For application delay, some
di¤erence could appear due to the fact that at least two co-authors are involved in the preparation
23French standard weekly worktime = 35h
24Number of business days between the ad publication and the application sending
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and checking of the application materials. For each applicant type, the sending is carried only by
one co-author. Depending on authorsavailability, this last operation could imply some variations
in application sending. According to models in Annex 5, the type of contract duration and the
application delay have not however any signicant inuence on the outcome of the application.
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Annex 4. 1st part of experiment: job applications by sector, location and applicants
type
Control
applicant
Test
applicant
Accounting 10.4% 11.7%
Association/Union 3.1% 3.5%
Transport 5.7% 4.3%
Bank/insurance 2.6% 4.8%
Construction 2.6% 3.1%
Retail trade 5.2% 6.5%
Wholesale trade 10.0% 10.8%
Audit & consulting 5.6% 6.9%
Culture/leisure 1.8% 1.3%
Sector Management 4.4% 3.0%
Teaching/research 5.2% 3.4%
Hotel/restaurant 6.1% 4.3%
Real estate 3.0% 4.3%
Telecom/computer 4.4% 5.2%
Health/social 6.5% 5.6%
Public organizations 1.7% 2.2%
Advertising/communication 4.8% 4.3%
Business services 7.4% 7.4%
Personal services 3.0% 2.2%
Industry/energy/waste 6.5% 5.2%
Seine-et-Marne 4.4% 3.0%
Yvelines 9.1% 8.6%
Essonne 4.8% 9.1%
Hauts-de-Seine 16.1% 15.5%
Seine-Saint-Denis 10.0% 12.1%
Val-de-Marne 12.2% 8.2%
Location Val-dOise 4.4% 3.5%
Paris central districts 9.1% 8.2%
Paris North-East districts 6.5% 5.2%
Paris North-West districts 11.7% 13.8%
Paris South-East districts 5.2%* 1.3%*
Applicants district and 6.5% 8.6%
contiguous Parisian districts
Total number of application 230 232
* indicates a signicant di¤erence in proportion at the 5% threshold.
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Annex 5: 1st part of experiment robustness check
Applicant type
Control app. ref. ref. ref.
Test app. -0.431*** (0.159) -0.404*** (0.156) -0.313** (0.139)
Application delay
No delay ref. ref. - - - -
1 day 0.264 (0.240) 0.200 (0.240) - - - -
2 days -0.129 (0.275) -0.188 (0.274) - - - -
3 days -0.300 (0.331) -0.327 (0.321) - - - -
4 days 0.269 (0.383) 0.267 (0.371) - - - -
5-9 days 0.820+ (0.459) 0.796+ (0.467) - - - -
Contract type
Short term contract ref. ref. - - - -
Long term contract -0.034 (0.196) -0.112 (0.195) - - - -
Job position
Accounting assistant ref. ref. - - - -
Acc. & secretary assist. 0.254 (0.240) 0.198 (0.239) - - - -
Other accounting assist. -0.598 (0.562) -0.669 (0.557) - - - -
Accountant -0.140 (0.226) -0.322 (0.217) - - - -
Specialized accountant 0.141 (0.305) -0.119 (0.299) - - - -
Mean wage o¤er -0.131*** (0.044) - - - - - -
Required education
Bac+3 ref. ref. - - - -
Not specied -0.619 (0.386) -0.387 (0.367) - - - -
CAP/BEP -0.766 (0.722) -0.543 (0.695) - - - -
Bac -1.199** (0.477) -0.898** (0.454) - - - -
Bac+2 -0.318 (0.377) -0.119 (0.362) - - - -
Required work experience
No experience ref. ref.
6 months-1 year -0.038 (0.292) -0.013 - - - -
2 years 0.178 (0.227) 0.076 - - - -
3 years -0.002 (0.256) -0.154 - - - -
4 or 5 years -0.440 (0.296) -0.736*** - - - -
Public transport time
Less than 30 minutes ref. ref. - - - -
31-60 minutes -0.359** (0.177) -0.353** (0.173) - - - -
61-90 minutes -0.764*** (0.277) -0.759*** (0.273) - - - -
91-120 minutes -0.734 (0.591) -0.729 (0.587) - - - -
120+ minutes -0.160 (0.586) -0.327 (0.670) - - - -
end of table, see next page
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Firm size
5- employees ref. ref. - - - -
6-19 emp. 0.176 (0.230) 0.162 (0.229) - - - -
20-49 emp. 0.378 (0.250) 0.322 (0.246) - - - -
50-249 emp. 0.338 (0.268) 0.247 (0.260) - - - -
250+ emp. 0.412 (0.309) 0.398 (0.307) - - - -
Firm sector
Accounting ref. ref. - - - -
Association/Union -0.287 (0.490) -0.275 (0.495) - - - -
Transport 0.641+ (0.376) 0.701+ (0.374) - - - -
Bank/insurance -0.304 (0.441) -0.263 (0.433) - - - -
Construction -0.029 (0.770) 0.016 (0.760) - - - -
Retail trade -0.002 (0.384) 0.050 (0.383) - - - -
Wholesale trade -0.250 (0.373) -0.218 (0.371) - - - -
Audit & consulting 0.397 (0.381) 0.367 (0.376) - - - -
Culture/leisure -0.957+ (0.541) -0.941+ (0.536) - - - -
Management -0.681 (0.489) -0.515 (0.454) - - - -
Teaching/research -1.658*** (0.464) -1.506*** (0.474) - - - -
Hotel/restaurant -0.882+ (0.452) -0.793+ (0.434) - - - -
Real estate 0.046 (0.445) 0.098 (0.433) - - - -
Telecom/computer -0.137 (0.403) -0.225 (0.407) - - - -
Health/social 0.118 (0.446) 0.161 (0.455) - - - -
Public orga. -0.098 (0.660) 0.015 (0.657) - - - -
Advertising/communication -0.194 (0.423) -0.207 (0.409) - - - -
Business services -0.398 (0.417) -0.379 (0.421) - - - -
Personal services -1.153+ (0.678) -1.009 (0.644) - - - -
Industry, energy and waste -1.143** (0.531) -1.040** (0.501) - - - -
Firm status
Private ref. ref.
Public 0.423 (0.439) 0.382 (0.436)
Not-for-Prot 0.305 (0.313) 0.211 (0.316)
Time dummies
March 2012 ref. ref. - - - -
April 2012 -1.343*** (0.439) -1.340*** (0.430) - - - -
May 2012 -0.329 (0.379) -0.364 (0.382) - - - -
June 2012 0.048 (0.361) -0.019 (0.364) - - - -
July 2012 -0.529 (0.340) -0.576+ (0.344) - - - -
Aug. 2012 -0.205 (0.371) -0.229 (0.373) - - - -
Sept. 9 2012 -0.310 (0.374) -0.401 (0.375) - - - -
Constant 1.826** (0.784) 0.386 (0.592) -0.796*** (0.093)
Observations 462 462 462
Pseudo-R2 0.232 0.216 0.012
Robust standard errors in brackets. +, ** and *** mean respectively signicant at 10%, 5% and
1% tresholds.
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Annex 6. 2nd part of experiment: job and rm characteristics of applications
Variable Description
Control
candidate
Test
candidate
Job position Accountant: 37.4% 34.1%
Specialized accountant: 18.4% 22.7%
Accounting assistant: 29.0%* 20.0%*
Acc. & secretary assistant: 12.6%* 20.5%*
Other accounting assistant: 2.6% 2.7%
Contract Long term (CDI) 21.1%* 32.4%*
Short term (CDD) 78.9%* 67.6%*
Short term contract duration (mean/sd/min/max, month): 7.2/2.5/6/18 8.3/4.7/6/36
Worktime25 (mean/sd/min/max, hours): 33.6/6.4/8/40 33.9/5.9/8/39
Required education Not specied: 34.2% 41.6%
CAP/BEP: 3.2% 2.2%
Bac: 8.9% 9.7%
Bac +2: 47.9% 41.1%
Bac +3: 5.8% 5.4%
Required work experience No experience: 21.1% 18.4%
6 months-1 year: 10.5% 13.0%
2 years: 29.5% 28.1%
3 years: 18.4% 18.9%
4 or 5 years: 20.5% 21.6%
Mean wage (mean/sd/min/max, e/hour): 12.8/2.7/8.6/23.6 12.5/2.4/8.6/20.8
Application delay26 (mean/sd/min/max): 2.7/1.5/0/7 2.5/1.7/0/9
Size 0-5 employees: 23.7% 23.8%
6-19 emp.: 27.4% 24.3%
20-49 emp.: 22.1% 21.1%
50-249 emp.: 16.8% 18.9%
250+ emp. 10.0% 11.9%
Firm status Private: 82.7% 82.1%
Public: 5.9% 5.0%
Not-for-prot: 11.4% 12.9%
Sector See Annex 7 - - - -
Location See Annex 7 - - - -
Total number of applications 190 185
* indicates a signicant di¤erence in mean or proportion between the two applicants at 5% thresh-
old.
Note: in the Table below, we can notice again some di¤erences in proportion for some job positions
and contract type. For job positions, these di¤erences do not hold anymore if we consider all accounting
assistant positions together. Concerning contract type, this is the opposite case as in the rst part
of the experiment (see Annex 3). According to models in Annex 9, both job characteristics have not
any signicant inuence on the outcome of the application.
25French standard weekly worktime = 35h
26# of business days between the ad publication and the application sending
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Annex 7. 2nd part of experiment: job applications by sector and applicants type
Control
applicant
Test
applicant
Accounting 10.5% 8.1%
Association/Union 5.2% 3.8%
Transport 2.1% 5.4%
Bank/insurance 4.8% 2.7%
Construction 4.2% 5.4%
Retail trade 5.8% 4.3%
Wholesale trade 12.1% 10.8%
Audit & consulting 6.8% 6.0%
Culture/leisure 2.1% 3.2%
Sector Management 5.3% 5.4%
Teaching/research 1.6% 2.2%
Hotel/restaurant 0.0%* 3.8%*
Real estate 6.8% 5.4%
Telecom/computer 3.2% 3.2%
Health/social 4.7% 7.0%
Public organizations 2.1% 1.6%
Advertising/communication 2.1% 1.6%
Business services 11.1% 9.2%
Personal services 4.2% 6.0%
Industry/energy/waste 5.3% 4.9%
Seine-et-Marne 4.8% 6.0%
Yvelines 10.5% 10.8%
Essonne 7.9% 4.9%
Hauts-de-Seine 16.8% 15.1%
Seine-Saint-Denis 11.6% 8.1%
Val-de-Marne 6.8%* 13.5%*
Location Val-dOise 3.7% 4.3%
Paris central districts 3.7% 4.3%
Paris North-East districts 5.3% 6.5%
Paris North-West districts 16.8% 13.5%
Paris South-East districts 3.7% 7.0%
Applicantsdistrict and 8.4% 6.0%
contiguous Parisian districts
Total number of application 190 185
* indicates a signicant di¤erence in mean or proportion between the two applicants at 5% thresh-
old.
Note: Proportion equality tests are not satised for one sector (hotel/restaurant) and one area
(Val-de-Marne). However, these two rm characteristics have no signicant inuence on the outcome
of application according to Annex 8.
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Annex 8. 2nd part of experiment: robustness check
Applicant type
Control app. ref. ref. ref.
Test app. -0.228 (0.190) -0.207 (0.185) -0.040 (0.171)
Application delay
No delay ref. ref. - - - -
1 day -0.650 (0.477) -0.529 (0.469) - - - -
2 days -0.626 (0.488) -0.596 (0.479) - - - -
3 days -1.142** (0.510) -1.020** (0.500) - - - -
4 days -1.945*** (0.624) -1.851*** (0.592) - - - -
5-9 days -0.989+ (0.594) -0.917 (0.567) - - - -
Contract type
Short term contract ref. ref. - - - -
Long term contract -0.173 (0.223) -0.223 (0.221) - - - -
Job position
Accounting assistant ref. ref. - - - -
Accounting, secretary and other assist. 0.250 (0.291) 0.160 (0.287) - - - -
Accountant 0.680** (0.287) 0.439+ (0.260) - - - -
Specialized accountant 0.526 (0.338) 0.268 (0.317) - - - -
Mean wage o¤er -0.114*** (0.044) - - - - - - - -
Required education
Bac+3 ref. ref. - - - -
Not specied or BEP/CAP -0.386 (0.373) -0.335 (0.382) - - - -
Bac -0.176 (0.456) -0.051 (0.459) - - - -
Bac+2 -0.441 (0.369) -0.352 (0.372) - - - -
Required work experience
No experience ref. ref.
6 months-1 year 0.139 (0.300) 0.071 (0.295) - - - -
2 years -0.214 (0.248) -0.286 (0.246) - - - -
3 years -0.118 (0.301) -0.255 (0.300) - - - -
4 or 5 years -0.459 (0.354) -0.714** (0.336) - - - -
Public transport time
Less than 30 minutes ref. ref. - - - -
31-60 minutes -0.266 (0.227) -0.241 (0.227) - - - -
61-90 minutes -0.928*** (0.356) -0.837** (0.354) - - - -
90+ minutes -0.578 (0.429) -0.461 (0.425) - - - -
end of the table, see next page
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Firm size
5- employees ref. ref. - - - -
6-19 emp. -0.585** (0.269) -0.562** (0.263) - - - -
20-49 emp. -0.296 (0.262) -0.303 (0.261) - - - -
50-249 emp. -0.011 (0.281) -0.060 (0.280) - - - -
250+ emp. -0.815** (0.385) -0.756** (0.379) - - - -
Firm sector
Accounting ref. ref. - - - -
Association/Union -0.845 (0.563) -0.761 (0.566) - - - -
Bank/insurance -0.742 (0.537) -0.671 (0.518) - - - -
Construction and real estates -1.010** (0.469) -0.907** (0.463) - - - -
Retail trade, hotel and restaurant -0.487 (0.525) -0.417 (0.527) - - - -
Wholesale trade -0.773+ (0.424) -0.675 (0.417) - - - -
Audit & consulting -0.865+ (0.476) -0.814+ (0.470) - - - -
Culture/leisure -0.822 (0.734) -0.590 (0.767) - - - -
Management 0.172 (0.444) 0.172 (0.444) - - - -
Teaching/research -1.194 (0.920) -0.955 (0.901) - - - -
Telecom/computer -0.940+ (0.529) -0.930+ (0.532) - - - -
Health/social -0.594 (0.548) -0.332 (0.513) - - - -
Public orga. -0.980 (0.963) -0.645 (0.981) - - - -
Advertising/communication 0.126 (0.561) 0.041 (0.565) - - - -
Business services -0.499 (0.398) -0.437 (0.400) - - - -
Personal services -0.918+ (0.483) -0.729 (0.477) - - - -
Industry, energy, waste and transport -1.579*** (0.611) -1.302** (0.571) - - - -
Firm status
Private ref. ref.
Public 0.679 (0.511) 0.664 (0.502)
Not-for-Prot 0.521 (0.366) 0.461 (0.363)
Time dummies
Oct. 2012 ref. ref. - - - -
Nov. 11 2012 0.086 (0.298) 0.094 (0.293) - - - -
Dec. 2012 0.109 (0.332) 0.180 (0.320) - - - -
Jan. 1 2013 0.014 (0.339) 0.119 (0.336) - - - -
Feb. 2013 -0.201 (0.310) -0.182 (0.311) - - - -
March 2013 -0.561+ (0.340) -0.538+ (0.325) - - - -
Constant 2.440*** (0.891) 1.008 (0.717) -1.196*** (0.119)
Observations 375 375 375
Pseudo-R2 0.195 0.177 0.0002
Robust standard errors in brackets. +, ** and *** mean respectively signicant at 10%, 5% and
1% tresholds.
Note: some sectors have to be merged due to perfect predictability of results otherwise. This is
the case here for: construction and real estate, retail trade and hotel/restaurant, and industry, energy,
waste and transport.
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Annex 9. 2nd part of experiment: job and rm characteristics of the applications for
the 2 sub-periods
1st sub-period (from Oct. 1 2012 2nd sub-period (from Dec.1 2012
to Nov. 30 2012) to Mar. 19 2013)
Variable Description
Control
candidate
Test
candidate
Control
candidate
Test
candidate
Job position Accountant: 30.9% 31.4% 42.2% 35.7%
Specialized acc.: 18.5% 17.1% 18.4% 26.1%
Accounting assistant: 32.1% 25.7% 26.6% 16.5%
Acc. & secretary ass.: 14.8% 21.4% 11.0% 20.0%
Other acc. assistant: 3.7% 4.3% 1.8% 1.7%
Contract Long term (CDI) 14.8%* 35.7%* 25.7% 30.4%
Short term (CDD) 85.2%* 64.3%* 74.3% 69.6%
Short term contract duration 7.0/1.5/6/10 7.8/2.4/6/12 7.2/2.8/6/18 8.5/5.8/6/36
(mean/sd/min/max, month):
Worktime27 (mean/sd/min/max): 33.0/6.6/8/39 33.8/5.9/8/39 34.0/6.2/9.5/40 33.9/6.0/9.5/39
Required education Not specied: 34.6% 42.9% 33.9% 40.9%
CAP/BEP: 2.5% 4.3% 3.7% 0.9%
Bac: 9.9% 8.6% 8.3% 10.4%
Bac +2: 48.2% 44.3% 47.7% 39.1%
Bac +3 4.9%* 0.0%* 6.4% 8.7%
Required work exp. No experience: 19.8% 21.4% 22.0% 16.5%
6 months-1 year: 11.1% 11.4% 10.1% 13.7%
2 years: 33.3% 35.7% 26.6% 23.5%
3 years: 22.2% 17.1% 15.6% 20.0%
4 or 5 years: 13.6% 14.3% 25.7% 26.1%
Mean wage (mean/sd/min/max, e/hour): 12.8/2.5/9.4/23.1 12.5/2.7/8.6/20.8 12.9/2.9/8.6/23.6 12.4/2.1/9.2/23.6
Application delay28 (mean/sd/min/max, days): 2.3/1.1/0/6* 1.6/0.9/0/4* 2.9/1.7/0/7 3.0/1.9/0/9
Size 0-5 employees: 17.3% 22.9% 28.4% 24.4%
6-19 emp.: 28.4% 22.9% 26.6% 25.2%
20-49 emp.: 29.6%* 14.3%* 16.5% 25.2%
50-249 emp.: 17.3% 25.7% 16.5% 14.8%
250+ emp.: 7.4% 14.3% 11.9% 10.4%
Firm status Private: 82.7% 81.4% 81.7% 79.1%
Public: 3.7% 5.7% 6.4% 5.2%
Not-for-prot: 13.6% 12.9% 11.9% 15.7%
Sector See Annex 10 - - - - - - - -
Location See Annex 10 - - - - - - - -
Total number of applications 81 70 109 115
* indicates a signicant di¤erence in mean or proportion between the two applicants at 5% thresh-
old.
Note: signicant di¤erence in proportion or mean for the rst sub-period, namely for contract
type, application delay, one education level and one rm size can be observed. Given the shortness of
this unexpected sub-period, this type of di¤erence might be inevitable. However, it applied to only a
few variables that have no signicant inuence on the outcome of applications according to Annex 10
and 11.
27French standard weekly worktime = 35h
28# of business days between ad publication and application sending
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Annex 10. 2nd part of experiment: job applications by sector and applicants type
for the 2 sub-periods
1st sub-period (from Oct. 1 2012 2nd sub-period (from Dec. 1 2012
to Nov. 30 2012) to Mar. 19 2013)
Control
applicant
Test
applicant
Control
applicant
Test
applicant
Accounting 7.4% 7.1% 12.8% 8.7%
Association/Union 5.0% 2.9% 5.5% 4.4%
Transport 1.2% 4.3% 2.8% 6.1%
Bank/insurance 4.9% 4.3% 4.6% 1.7%
Construction 6.2% 7.1% 2.8% 4.4%
Retail trade 4.9% 4.3% 6.4% 4.4%
Wholesale trade 11.1% 14.3% 12.8% 8.7%
Audit & consulting 7.4% 1.4% 6.4% 8.7%
Culture/leisure 3.7% 1.4% 0.9% 4.4%
Sector Management 1.2% 7.1% 8.3% 4.4%
Teaching/research 0.0% 1.4% 2.8% 2.6%
Hotel/restaurant 0.0% 2.9% 0.0%* 4.4%*
Real estate 11.1% 7.1% 3.7% 4.4%
Telecom/computer 2.3% 4.3% 3.7% 2.6%
Health/social 7.4% 5.7% 2.8% 7.8%
Public organizations 1.2% 2.9% 2.8% 0.9%
Advertising/communication 3.7% 1.4% 0.9% 1.8%
Business services 13.6% 8.6% 9.2% 9.6%
Personal services 4.9% 7.1% 3.7% 5.2%
Industry/energy/waste 2.5% 4.3% 7.3% 5.2%
Seine-et-Marne 3.7% 7.1% 5.5% 5.2%
Yvelines 11.1% 11.4% 10.1% 10.4%
Essonne 9.9%* 0.0%* 6.4% 7.8%
Hauts-de-Seine 22.2% 14.3% 12.8% 15.7%
Seine-Saint-Denis 9.9% 8.6% 12.8% 7.8%
Val-de-Marne 3.7% 11.4% 9.2% 14.8%
Location Val-dOise 2.5% 8.6% 4.6% 1.7%
Paris central districts 0.0% 4.3% 6.4% 4.4%
Paris North-East districts 7.4% 5.7% 3.7% 7.0%
Paris North-West districts 21.0% 14.3% 13.8% 13.0%
Paris South-East districts 0.0%* 8.6%* 6.4% 6.1%
Applicantsdistrict and 8.6% 5.7% 8.3% 6.1%
contiguous Parisian districts
Total number of application 81 70 109 115
* indicates a signicant di¤erence in mean or proportion between the two applicants at 5% thresh-
old.
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Annex 11. 2nd part of experiment: robustness checks for the 1st sub-period
Applicant type
Control app. ref. ref. ref.
Test app. -1.207*** (0.428) -0.929** (0.382) -0.473+ (0.168)
Application delay
No delay ref. ref. - - - -
1 day 1.495 (1.066) 1.312+ (0.797) - - - -
2 days 0.652 (1.042) 0.404 (0.735) - - - -
3 days -0.011 (1.052) 0.220 (0.784) - - - -
4-9 days 0.445 (1.232) -0.092 (0.932) - - - -
Contract type
Short term contract ref. ref. - - - -
Long term contract -0.213 (0.482) -0.327 (0.464) - - - -
Job position
Accounting assistant ref. ref. - - - -
Account., secretary and other assist. -0.718 (0.640) -1.024+ (0.563) - - - -
Accountant 1.095** (0.533) 0.565 (0.427) - - - -
Specialized accountant 0.481 (0.633) -0.236 (0.502) - - - -
Mean wage o¤er -0.330*** (0.111) - - - - - - - -
Required education
Bac+3 ref. ref. - - - -
Not specied or BEP/CAP -0.007 (0.900) -0.333 (0.883) - - - -
Bac -0.101 (1.148) 0.016 (1.086) - - - -
Bac+2 -0.443 (0.890) -0.599 (0.864) - - - -
Required work experience
No experience ref. ref.
6 months-1 year 0.368 (0.659) -0.042 (0.632) - - - -
2 years 0.352 (0.476) 0.079 (0.417) - - - -
3 years 0.136 (0.612) -0.443 (0.558) - - - -
4 or 5 years 0.763 (0.681) -0.241 (0.527) - - - -
Public transport time
Less than 30 minutes ref. ref. - - - -
31-60 minutes -0.318 (0.490) -0.067 (0.432) - - - -
61-90 minutes -1.343 (0.853) -0.413 (0.648) - - - -
90+ minutes -0.152 (0.689) 0.411 (0.643) - - - -
end of the table, see next page
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Firm size
5- employees ref. ref. - - - -
6-19 emp. -1.191+ (0.650) -0.931+ (0.554) - - - -
20-49 emp. -1.010+ (0.581) -0.750 (0.501) - - - -
50-249 emp. -0.805 (0.620) -0.488 (0.503) - - - -
250+ emp. -2.309*** (0.771) -2.223*** (0.853) - - - -
Firm sector
Accounting ref. ref. - - - -
Association/Union 5.846*** (1.172) 5.244*** (0.967) - - - -
Construction and real estates 5.270*** (0.885) 4.349*** (0.599) - - - -
Retail trade, hotel and restaurant 7.021*** (1.157) 5.781*** (0.892) - - - -
Wholesale trade 5.718*** (1.126) 4.752*** (0.726) - - - -
Audit & consulting 6.304*** (0.932) 5.672*** (0.723) - - - -
Culture/leisure -0.430 (1.193) -1.178 (1.110) - - - -
Management 5.364*** (1.104) 4.435*** (0.906) - - - -
Telecom/computer 7.068*** (1.150) 5.354*** (0.909) - - - -
Health/social 5.958*** (0.947) 6.026*** (0.870) - - - -
Public orga., teaching/research 6.947*** (1.176) 7.150*** (1.075) - - - -
culture/leisure
Advertising/communication 6.469*** (1.303) 5.645*** (1.123) - - - -
Business services 5.418*** (0.967) 4.614*** (0.767) - - - -
Personal services, bank and insurance 5.842*** (1.012) 5.293*** (0.844) - - - -
Industry, energy, waste and transport 6.574*** (1.065) 5.658*** (0.817) - - - -
Firm status
Private ref. ref.
Public 0.208 (0.643) -0.015 (0.583)
Not-for-Prot -0.212 (0.684) -0.603 (0.592)
Time dummies
Oct. 2012 ref. ref. - - - -
Nov. 1 2012 0.026 (0.402) -0.018 (0.356) - - - -
Constant -2.434 (1.686) -5.043*** (1.378) -0.992*** (0.168)
Observations 151 151 151
Pseudo-R2 0.355 0.303 0.027
Robust standard errors in brackets. +, ** and *** mean respectively signicant at 10%, 5% and
1% tresholds.
Note: some sectors have to be merged due to perfect predictability of results otherwise. This is
the case here for: construction and real estate; retail trade and hotel/restaurant; public organization,
research/teaching and culture/leisure; personal services and bank/insurance, and, industry, energy,
waste and transport.
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Annex 12. Robustness check: 2nd part of experiment for the 2nd sub-period
Applicant type
Control app. ref. ref. ref.
Test app. 0.613+ (0.316) 0.614** (0.312) 0.264 (0.228)
Application delay
No delay ref. ref. - - - -
1 day -1.805*** (0.678) -1.746*** (0.677) - - - -
2 days -1.197+ (0.662) -1.197+ (0.654) - - - -
3 days -2.067*** (0.786) -2.016*** (0.774) - - - -
4-9 days -2.629*** (0.796) -2.617*** (0.780) - - - -
Contract type
Short term contract ref. ref. - - - -
Long term contract -0.815** (0.367) -0.865** (0.353) - - - -
Job position
Accounting assistant ref. ref. - - - -
Account., secretary and other assist. 0.565 (0.500) 0.501 (0.478) - - - -
Accountant 0.989** (0.463) 0.838** (0.427) - - - -
Specialized accountant 0.646 (0.612) 0.439 (0.562) - - - -
Mean wage o¤er -0.060 (0.079) - - - - - - - -
Required education
Bac+3 ref. ref. - - - -
Not specied or BEP/CAP -1.031+ (0.539) -0.932+ (0.560) - - - -
Bac -0.531 (0.648) -0.469 (0.644) - - - -
Bac+2 -0.915+ (0.553) -0.847 (0.547) - - - -
Required work experience
No experience ref. ref.
6 months-1 year 0.361 (0.416) 0.297 (0.402) - - - -
2 years -0.425 (0.434) -0.449 (0.419) - - - -
3 years -0.533 (0.480) -0.597 (0.463) - - - -
4 or 5 years -1.445** (0.597) -1.587*** (0.545) - - - -
Public transport time
Less than 30 minutes ref. ref. - - - -
31-60 minutes -0.013 (0.365) -0.020 (0.364) - - - -
61-90 minutes -0.845 (0.521) -0.910+ (0.526) - - - -
90+ minutes -0.908 (0.766) -0.866 (0.722) - - - -
end of the table, see next page
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Firm size
5- employees ref. ref. - - - -
6-19 emp. -0.479 (0.427) -0.505 (0.422) - - - -
20-49 emp. -1.990*** (0.654) -2.012*** (0.614) - - - -
50-249 emp. -0.595 (0.551) -0.636 (0.528) - - - -
250+ emp. -0.923 (0.959) -0.948 (0.947) - - - -
Firm sector
Accounting ref. ref. - - - -
Construction and real estates -1.283+ (0.696) -1.165+ (0.667) - - - -
Retail and wholesale trade, hotel -1.728*** (0.571) -1.573*** (0.567) - - - -
and restaurant
Audit, consulting and management -1.428** (0.583) -1.380** (0.590) - - - -
Health/social 0.204 (0.714) 0.274 (0.707) - - - -
Public organization, teaching/research, -3.074*** (1.112) -2.890*** (1.081) - - - -
culture/leisure
Advertising/communication -1.003 (1.028) -1.019 (0.941) - - - -
Business services, computer/telecom, -1.308** (0.521) -1.194** (0.510) - - - -
industry, energy, waste and transport
Personal services, bank and insurance -1.257 (0.818) -1.131 (0.806) - - - -
Firm status
Private ref. ref.
Public 1.982** (0.902) 1.881** (0.891)
Not-for-Prot 0.058 (0.505) 0.103 (0.499)
Time dummies
Dec. 2012 ref. ref. - - - -
Jan. 1 2013 0.257 (0.394) 0.238 (0.394) - - - -
Feb. 2013 -0.101 (0.415) -0.100 (0.403) - - - -
Mar. 2013 -0.600 (0.406) -0.661 (0.414) - - - -
Constant 3.558** (1.473) 2.894** (1.245) -1.388*** (0.174)
Observations 224 224 224
Pseudo-R2 0.389 0.387 0.009
Robust standard errors in brackets. +, ** and *** mean respectively signicant at 10%, 5% and
1% tresholds.
Note: some sectors have to be merged due to perfect predictability of results otherwise. This is
the case here for: construction and real estate; retail trade, wholesale trade and hotel/restaurant; au-
dit/consulting and management; public organization, research/teaching and culture/leisure; personal
services and bank/insurance, and, industry/energy/waste, computer/telecom. and transport.
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Annexe 13. Experiment timing
Figure 6: Timing of the experiment
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